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Abstract
This paper presents an exclusive classification of the largest crashes in Dow Jones Industrial
Average (DJIA), SP500 and NASDAQ in the past century. Crashes are objectively defined as
the top-rank filtered drawdowns (loss from the last local maximum to the next local minimum
disregarding noise fluctuations), where the size of the filter is determined by the historical volatility
of the index. It is shown that all crashes can be linked to either an external shock, e.g., outbreak
of war, or a log-periodic power law (LPPL) bubble with an empirically well-defined complex value
of the exponent. Conversely, with one sole exception all previously identified LPPL bubbles are
followed by a top-rank drawdown. As a consequence, the analysis presented suggest a one-to-one
correspondence between market crashes defined as top-rank filtered drawdowns on one hand and
surprising news and LPPL bubbles on the other. We attribute this correspondence to the Efficient
Market Hypothesis effective on two quite different time scales depending on whether the market
instability the crash represent is internally or externally generated.
1 Addressing the Problem
The characterization of large negative moves on the stock market is by definition of profound
importance to risk management of investment portfolios. An objective non-arbitrary definition of
“large” or similarly “a crash” has yet to be agreed upon by the financial community. Here, such a
definition of a crash is presented in terms of ǫ-drawdowns, i.e., noise filtered drawdowns where the
size of the filter ǫ is determined by the historical volatility of the index. An ǫ-drawdown classifies
as a crash if its rank i ∼ 1, i.e., the special name “crash” is reserved for the “few” largest negative
price drops. Ideally, one would like to “prove” that these largest negative price drops are outliers
to the bulk of the distribution of price drops. As for now, a large body of evidence has accumulated
which suggest that it this is most likely the case [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] but not more. This problem
will be further addressed in a future publication and this paper only provides for an “eye-balling”
analysis by the reader with figures 1-3. The reader is then left to judge for himself but should note
that for the largest filter used (see figure legend), all ǫ-drawdowns for all 3 indices are parametrized
by the fit with the function function (4).
Specifically, for the DJIA the four largest ǫ-drawdowns are characterized as crashes, for the
SP500 the five largest and for the NASDAQ the six largest. Naturally, this does not exclude, e.g.,
that the fifth largest ǫ-drawdown in the DJIA may also be characterized as a crash, but this is
the interpretation of “few” put forward here. Returning to the other two indices, for the SP500
an additional ǫ-drawdown has been included due to the higher historical volatility of the SP500
compared to that of the DJIA. For the same reason, the six largest ǫ-drawdowns are considered for
the NASDAQ. The time series extend from 01/01 1900 to 17/07 2000 for the DJIA, from 29/11
1940 to 17/07 2000 for SP500 and from 05/02 1971 to 17/07 2000 for the NASDAQ.
An ǫ-drawdown is defined as a persistent decrease in the price over consecutive days from a local
maximum to the next local minimum ignoring price increases in between the two of relative size
less than ǫ. Since they are constructed from runs of the same sign variations, ǫ-drawdowns embody
a rather subtle dependence which captures the way successive drops can influence each other. This
“persistence” is not measured by the distribution of returns because, by its very definition, it forgets
about the relative positions of the returns1. A priori, the optimal choice of filter should be bounded
by 0 < ǫ ≤ σ, where σ is the historical volatility, but as the noise distribution for financial data
is unknown and presumably not stationary over small time scales a more qualified choice seems
difficult to make.
For each of the 12 crashes considered, a causal explanation in terms of
• A surprising new piece of information as the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) demands.
We refer to this as a “shock”.
• A prior LPPL “bubble”, as defined below, to be deflated by the crash reminiscent of Adam
Smith’s “invisible hand”.
for the crash is investigated. One may very well argue, as the author attempts to do, that the
two proposed mechanisms are two sides of the same thing, however, on quite different time scales.
2 Statistics of LPPL Bubbles
In a series of papers, the present author with D. Sornette and co-workers [2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]
have shown that on the FX, Gold and major stock markets, crashes are often preceded by precursory
characteristics quantified by a log-periodic power law, specifically
p (t) = A+B (tc − t)
z
+ C (tc − t)
z
cos (ω ln (tc − t)− φ) (1)
1Realizing this allows one to construct synthetic price data for statistical tests with the same return distribution by
a reshuffling of the returns[2]
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The results on the US stock markets have been confirmed by several independent groups [13, 14, 15].
Eq. (1) has its origin in a Landau-expansion type of the argument and the underlying Scaling Ansatz
is simply
dF (x)
d lnx
= αF (x) + βF 2 (x) . . . (2)
which to first order leads to eq. (1) with an arbitrary choice of periodic function. The concept that
only relative changes are important has a solid foundation in finance, but a detailed and rigorous
derivation or justification of (2) has yet to be achieved. Instead, the predictions that comes from
applying this Ansatz, specifically those related to α = z + iω, to the data have been compared
using different markets and time periods. Specifically, assuming a Gaussian distribution it has
been established empirically that
ω ≈ 6.36± 1.56 z ≈ 0.33± 0.18 (3)
for over thirty crashes on major financial markets [5, 6]. Hence, (1) combined with (3) is used as
a definition of a LPPL bubble. Together with the concepts of “shocks”, as defined above, we are
lead to a consistent and coherent picture when combined with a ranking of ǫ-drawdowns.
3 Statistics of Drawdowns
As mentioned, an increasing amount of evidence that the largest negative market moves belongs
to a different population than the smaller has accumulated [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]. Specifically, it was
found that the cumulative distributions of drawdowns on the worlds major financial markets, e.g.,
the U.S. stock markets, the Hong-Kong stock market, the currency exchange market (FX) and the
Gold market are well parameterised by a stretched exponential
N(x) = Ae−bx
z
(4)
except for the 1% (or less) largest drawdowns. In general, it was found that the exponent z ≈
0.7 − 0.9 [3]. It is worth noting that only the distributions for the DJIA, the US$/DM exchange
rate and the Gold price exhibits “potential” outliers for the complement drawup distribution,
whereas (all?) other markets shows a strong asymmetry between the tails of the drawdown and
drawup distributions the latter having no outliers. This asymmetry has also been confirmed for
smaller losses/gains [16]. The range of the exponent for the drawup distributions is also generally
higher with z ≈ 0.9− 1.1 except for the FX and Gold markets [3].
In previous analysis and identification outliers on the major financial markets drawdowns
(drawups) were either simply defined as a continuous decrease (increase) in the closing value of
the price [3] or a simple filter of 1% and 2% were used [1, 5]. Hence, in the first case a drawdown
(drawup) was terminated either by any increase (decrease) in the price no matter how small. In
the second case the filter was arbitrarily chosen independently of the volatility of the data. Here
an ǫ-drawdown is defined as follows. A local maximum in the price is identified. Then a contin-
uation of the downward trend ignoring movements in the reverse direction smaller than ǫ = aσ is
identified. Here, sigma is the historical volatility of the index calculated from the data and a = 1
for the DJIA and a = 1/2 for the SP500 and NASDAQ.
4 Correspondence between Crashes, Bubbles and Shocks
In figures 1-3 we see the cumulative ǫ-drawdown distributions of the DJIA, SP500 and Nasdaq.
The thresholds used were a relative threshold of ǫ = aσ, where σ is the historical volatility and a is
a number between 0 and 2, see figure legends. We see that the fits with eq. (4) for all three index
fully captures the distributions except for a few cases which is referred to as “crashes”. In tables
1-3 we see the ranking of the ǫ-drawdowns found in the three historical indices.
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If we only note the dates of the four (DJIA), five (SP500) and six (NASDAQ) largest ǫ-
drawdowns in the tables, i.e., ǫ 6= 0, 2, we get
• DJIA: 1914, 1929, 1940 and 1987
• SP500: 1946, 1962, 1987⋆, 1998, 2000
• Nasdaq: 1978, 1987⋆, 1998⋆, 2000
Here ⋆ denotes two ǫ-drawdown linked to the same event. Except for the crashes related to the
outbreak of WWI in 1914 and WWII in 1940 quite remarkably all of these outliers have log-
periodic power law precursors well-described by eq. (1) and (3). In addition, all have previously
been published [4, 6]. For the pure drawdowns, i.e., ǫ = 0, the ranking order is permutated and for
the DJIA the 1940 event is replaced by a 1933.55 event, for the SP500 the 1978 event is replaced by
a 1974.72 event and for the NASDAQ the 1978 event is replaced by a 1990.62 event. These three
“new” events coincide with the political maneuvering of president F. D. Roosevelt2 upsetting the
financial markets, the political turmoil caused by the resignation and the controversial pardoning
of president R. Nixon on August 8th and September 8th 1974 and an ǫ-drawdown of 17.8% in the
Japanese Nikkei index, respectively, and should thus be classified as a shocks.
The results presented here means that the joint evidence from the ranking of ǫ-drawdowns in
the DJIA, the SP500 and the Nasdaq identifies all crashes with log-periodic power law precursors
found in the US stock market except the crash after the LPPL bubble of 1937. Naturally, the
optimal threshold (according to some specific definition) used in the outlier identification process
is related to that particular index volatility. However, the volatility is again nothing but a measure
of the two-point correlations present in the index, which we have proved to be an insufficient
measure when dealing with extreme market events. This presumably explains this miss in the
1-to-1 correspondence between crashes on one hand and shocks and LPPL bubbles on the other.
5 Conclusion
The analysis presented here have strengthen the evidence for outliers in the financial markets
and that the concept can be used as a objective and quantitative definition of a market crash.
Furthermore, we have shown that the existence of outliers in the drawdown distribution is primarily
related to the existence of log-periodic power law bubbles prior to the occurrence of these outliers
or crashes. In fact, of the 12 largest drawdowns identified as outliers only 3 did not have prior
log-periodic power law bubble and these 3 outliers could be linked to a specific major historical
event. In complement, only 1 (1937) previously identified log-periodic power law bubble was not
identified as an outlier.
the analysis presented suggest a one-to-one correspondence between market crashes defined as
top-rank filtered drawdowns on one hand and surprising news and LPPL bubbles on the other. We
attribute this correspondence to the Efficient Market Hypothesis effective on to quite different time
scales depending on whether the market instability the crash represent is internally or externally
generated.
Further work is needed to clarify the role of different coarse-graining methods as well as to
arrive at a quantitative choice for ǫ based on the data. Naturally, the choice of ǫ should not only
be determined by the volatility but should also depend further on the type of market.
2Roosevelt New Deal policy included the passing of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 as well as going of the Gold
standard in 1933.
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Cited papers by the author are available from http://www.get2net.dk/kgs/pub.html.
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ǫ Date Size Duration Class ǫ Date Size Duration Class
0 1987.786⋆ 30.7% 4 days Bubble σ 1914.374 32.7% 64 days Shock
0 1914.579 28.8% 2 days Shock σ 1987.786⋆ 30.7% 4 days Bubble
0 1929.818⋆ 23.6% 3 days Bubble σ 1929.810⋆ 29.5% 6 days Bubble
0 1933.549 18.6% 4 days Depression σ 1940.261 23.7% 44days Shock
Table 1: List and properties of the highest ranked ǫ-drawdowns for ǫ = 0 (left part) and ǫ = σ (right
part) of the DJIA from 01/01 1900 to 17/07 2000. The outliers are ranked by decreasing amplitudes.
The term “shock” refers to an outlier which has been triggered by an event exogenous to the market.
The term “bubble” embodies the idea that the corresponding ǫ-drawdown corresponds to a crash
ending a speculative LPPL bubble.
ǫ Date Size Duration Class ǫ Date Size Duration Class
0 1987.784⋆ 28.5% 4 days Bubble σ/2 1987.784⋆ 28.5% 4 days Bubble
0 1962.370⋆ 13.7% 9 days Bubble σ/2 1946.636⋆ 16.2% 9 days Bubble
0 1998.649⋆ 12.4% 4 days Bubble σ/2 1962.370⋆ 13.7% 9 days Bubble
0 1987.805⋆ 11.8% 3 days Bubble σ/2 1998.649⋆ 12.4% 4 days Bubble
0 1974.721 11.2% 9 days Shock σ/2 1987.805⋆ 11.9% 3 days Bubble
Table 2: Same as table 1 but for the SP500 stock market index from 29/11 1940 to 17/07 2000.
ǫ Date Size Duration Class ǫ Date Size Duration Class
0 2000.268⋆ 25.3% 5 days Bubble σ/2 1987.762† 27.7% 11 days Bubble
0 1987.784 † 24.6% 5 days Bubble σ/2 2000.268⋆ 25.3% 5 days Bubble
0 1987.805 † 17.0% 5 days Bubble σ/2 1998.630† 19.2% 9 days Bubble
0 1998.649† 16.6% 4 days Bubble σ/2 1998.724† 18.6% 9 days Bubble
0 2000.374⋆ 14.9% 5 days Bubble σ/2 1987.806† 17% 5 days Bubble
0 1990.622 12.5% 6 days Shock σ/2 1978.753† 16.6% 21 days Bubble
Table 3: Same as table 1 but for the NASDAQ stock market index from 05/02 1971 to 17/07 2000.
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Figure 1: ǫ-drawdown distribution for DJIA from 01/01 1900 to 17/07 2000.
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Figure 2: ǫ-drawdown distribution for SP500 from 29/11 1940 to 17/07 2000.
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Figure 3: ǫ-drawdown distribution for NASDAQ from 05/02 1971 to 17/07 2000.
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